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THE EMBODIMENT OF CODE
What is the Central Idea?
Two different levels must be distinguished with regard 
to the question of the presentation, the collection, and 
the preservation of digital works of art. The one level 
concerns the level of the code, which is binary and in 
itself completely lacks any meaning. It can become an 
image, sound, text, or a film. The other level is the level 
of the interpretation of this code. It is produced using a 
complex mechanical apparatus consisting of hardware, 
operating system, and software, which interprets the 
code and thus allows it to be presented.
Embodiment
The second thesis is that in order to be able to be mani­
festly understood and be given meaning, digital code 
always has to possess a specific embodiment. Code 
without embodiment is like a text that is not read. An 
analogy to the theater may serve to elucidate this rela­
tionship. On the one hand there are the printed lines 
of a drama, and on the other hand there is the perform­
ance of these lines by an actor. The performance takes 
place at a specific location at a specific time and is 
done by a specific person. At first, Hamlet, the Prince 
of Denmark, is only a text. It is not until it is staged 
by an actor that this text is performed. However, the 
actor in this performance only embodies the Prince of 
Denmark. He is not Hamlet himself. He only embodies 
and plays text. This example makes it clear that the 
same text can be embodied by a variety of possible 
actors—fat ones, thin ones, tall ones, short ones, healthy 
ones, and sickly ones. And one cannot even say which 
of these many actors is the "true" or "real" enactment 
of Hamlet. Rather, one can only say that there are many 
different possible embodiments and performances.
The same thing applies for digital code. It is not until 
the code has been interpreted by certain hardware and 
software that it can be represented, presented, and 
made visible. Therefore one can say that the hardware 
and software system embodies the digital code, but is 
not the code itself, just as little as the actor is not Hamlet. 
One can also extend this argument to the performance 
of music. What music, theater, and the computer have 
in common is that they know two completely separate 
modes of existence: score, lines, or code on the one 
hand, and orchestra, actor, or software on the other.
The Distinction Between Organization and Structure 
In connection with the issue being argued here, it 
makes sense to distinguish between the organization 
and the structure of a work of media art. What is the 
fundamental distinction between organization and struc­
ture? If you, for example, consider a business enter­
prise or an authority, then the business enterprise more 
often than not has a manager, a managing director and 
several department heads, various departments, a per­
sonnel committee and an employee council, a driver, 
and a janitor. These abstract hierarchies and positions 
make up the organization of the respective company. 
However, it is also clear that these positions can be 
filled by different persons, who then assume the 
respective function within this organization. Thus the
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director, for example, can be male or female, old or 
young, have this or that education, speak this or that 
language. One refers to the concrete embodiment of a 
particular organization at a particular time at a particular 
location as the structure of this business enterprise. 
Structure is therefore embodied organization.
One now sees that the organization of a business 
enterprise is an abstract, general scheme that can be 
embodied in a variety of ways by concrete persons, 
objects, or spaces. We can therefore definitely speak 
of the concrete embodiment of an organization. One 
can notice the same difference between these two 
forms of existence in works of media art. As viewers 
we can refer to the abstract organization of such a 
work—that is, to the code—or to its concrete embodi­
ment in the manner in which it is produced by a specific 
medial structure of hardware and software conditions at 
a particular location at a particular time. The interpreta­
tion of the code by a certain hardware and software 
causes the performance itself to become a historical 
event that occurs at a particular location at a particular 
time and can be observed by particular viewers. Per­
formed and embodied code is therefore always histo­
rical. It is present, here and now, all around us.
Notation and Performance
Unlike traditional image media such as paintings or 
drawings, digital works exist in two completely different 
forms—the state of notation and the state of perform­
ance.
To begin with, video only exists in the form of a nota­
tion, which is an analog or digital code on a tape or on 
a disk. One cannot discern what has been stored onto 
a magnetic tape or a plastic disk merely by looking at it. 
In addition, the notation of a video does not, however, 
consist of only this code, but also of numerous original, 
material objects. This may seem surprising at first. But 
there is no form without matter. The code possesses a 
certain materiality. The specific materiality of a video is 
already a historical form of embodiment which defines 
itself through the original image and sound carriers onto 
which the code has been physically stored. Here, at the 
level of the material carrier, it also becomes clear that 
one and the same code may possess many different 
possible material image and sound carriers, for example 
VHS, Betamax, Video 2000, U-matic, or Betacam. One 
therefore cannot say what the "true" or "real" material 
carrier of a video is, but only that there is a variety of 
possible carriers, all of which possess certain advan­
tages and disadvantages. In this plurality of material car­
rier systems one can only indicate which of the original, 
historical, and authentic image and sound carriers was 
used to produce the work. This is then very important 
for its musealization.
Video art exists on a tape or on a disk in the form of its 
non-substitutable, original, material elements. In con­
trast, all of the specific components required for the 
performance of this kind of notation, such as players, 
monitors, beamers, amplifiers, speakers, computers, 
operating systems, software, or certain cable 
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connections, do not belong to the organization of the 
work. Rather they represent the respective temporary 
embodiment of the code.
The abstract organization of a work of media art in the 
form of its notation or installation instructions corre­
sponds with its concrete embodiment in the form of its 
performance and representation at a particular location 
at a particular time for particular viewers. An embodied 
presentation or performance is always already an inter­
pretation of the work. One and the same notation 
therefore corresponds with many different types of 
performance and possible interpretations. This differ­
ence between notation and presentation is found in all 
magnetic or digital image and sound recording systems. 
One cannot discern from the binary numeric code alone 
what kind of document one is dealing with. To do this 
one requires the so-called meta-code that is written at 
the beginning of each binary numeric sequence and 
describes its interpretation.
Here, too, the form in which data become visible or 
audible is dependent on the concrete embodiment of 
the binary ASCII notation. One and the same binary 
numerical code can be interpreted as an image, a sound, 
or a text document. The software assumes the role of 
the curator, the symphony orchestra, or the actor. The 
sense and meaning of binary numeric columns is there­
fore dependent on concrete hardware and software, 
which presents the numeric notation at a particular loca­
tion at a particular time for a particular viewer. Hardware 
and software are therefore systems of embodiment, 
performance, and presentation. They give a concrete, 
physical body to the abstract organization of data, and 
this body exists at a particular time at a particular loca­
tion for a particular viewer.
However, let us linger a moment on the questions and 
problems associated with the presentation of digital 
works of art. On the part of hardware components, too, 
it becomes clear that every exchange or substitution of 
a hardware component has an influence on the form, 
meaning, and aesthetic experience of such a work of 
art. In this respect, perhaps the most important factor 
to be taken into account are the "mentality" differences 
in the interpreting software. Impulse frequencies, scan­
ning rates, and temporal access speeds may likewise 
be responsible for enormous differences in the perform­
ance, but they do not create such serious differences 
in the embodiment. Context effects result from substi­
tuting the operating system as well. Windows, Apple 
Macintosh, and UNIX are in principle the three large 
operating systems that fundamentally influence the 
appearance, the form, and the behavior of software. 
Added to this are the various operating system ver­
sions, which cause different appearance, function, 
and performance.
The Embodiment of Video
If one goes all the way back to the beginning of the pro­
duction of a video, one notices that the production of 
image and sound is to a large extent dependent on the 
respective medial apparatus used to produce the video. 
This begins with the recording camera used, the optical 
system, and the way in which with the aid of a vidicon 
tube or a light-sensitive chip the incident, color struc­
tured light is converted into an electric signal, which in 
turn is stored on an analog or on a digital storage me­
dium. The decisive parameters of the image recording 
and the image representation are first of all lens sys­
tem, conversion, and the form of storage. Up to this 
point it is already discernible that the concrete embodi­
ment of image and sound in the form of a recorded 
image and sound format is always dependent on the 
respective medial apparatus used to produce the video. 
Thus it is also always historical. The medial apparatus 
that produces the concrete embodiment of code is the 
actual proof for the originality of the material object, the 
image, and sound carrier.
The medial apparatus or the medial dispositive is there­
fore the decisive factor in the question regarding the 
embodiment of code. There are two different medial 
arrangements or apparatuses. The one medial appara­
tus is the historical one. It is the apparatus with which 
the video was made at a particular time at a particular 
location. This historical, technical-medial arrangement 
has entered the work as form. This historical technol­
ogy that was available to the author when he produced 
his work has left its mark on the organization of the 
work. It can be construed from the form of the image 
and the sound. It has become a feature of the work 
that defines its originality as direct, authentic evidence 
of its historical origin.
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This historical, medial apparatus, however, is also con­
fronted by a second medial arrangement, which I would 
like to call the current dispositive of presentation, per­
formance, and enactment The range of our cultural her­
itage and our (current) treatment of (historical) forms 
and objects lies in the tension between the historical 
apparatus of production and the current apparatus of 
medial presentation, performance, and enactment.
During the production of the video, the historical dis­
positive of the medial layout has left its mark on the 
organization of the work as its form. One can recog­
nize, describe, and interpret its historicity by this. 
In the analysis and interpretation of the form of a work 
we describe its historicity, its time restriction, and its 
embeddedness in certain intellectual, cultural, economic, 
or social currents of its period of origin, of which it is 
an expression. This is essentially the point of view 
taken by Erwin Panofsky's iconology. Form is the 
historical embodiment of code.
However, the current dispositive of medial arrangement 
is always contemporary. It is always current, always 
here and now, always there, always all around us, 
always present. This is the reason we do not notice it. 
Borrowing a term coined by the American perception 
psychologist James Jerome Gibson, one could also 
speak of a surrounding medial layout. It is the current 
embodiment of code in the form of its performance, 
its presentation, or its enactment.
The Performance of Videos
Thus it immediately becomes clear that there can be 
very many different ways of presenting one and the 
same video. This is due to the specific materiality of the 
media systems involved. But not only because of this. 
The location as well and its associated spatial, visual, 
acoustic, institutional, cultural, and economic conditions 
exercise a significant influence on the appearance, 
embodiment, and meaning of the same video.
What does it actually mean when one speaks of "the 
same" video? In what sense does this manner of speak­
ing even make sense? If I am referring to a concrete 
material object such as the mini digital videotape I am 
holding in my left hand, then I can reproduce the work 
embodied in this mini digital video in very different 
medial arrangements. Each time, the concrete appear­
ance or presence of the played-back tape is another 
one, a presentation or performance embodied in another 
way.
But it cannot be said which performance of a video the 
"true" or "real" one is, rather only that there are many 
different possible types of performance. If one slightly 
alters a famous statement made by the American 
philosopher Nelson Goodman, one could say the follow­
ing: There is not the way a video is, but there are many 
ways.
These differences and shifts in the concrete embodi­
ment of the medial apparatus go unnoticed in current 
performance situations. They remain the latent back­
ground structure of the aesthetic experience. It is not 
until one makes a specific methodical comparison of 
the overall medial apparatus with a systematic variation 
of the individual variables that the resulting differences 
become observable in the presence, appearance, and 
embodiment of the work.
Collecting
What does it mean to collect videos and preserve them 
for posterity? It is obvious that we cannot preserve 
everything there is for posterity. Therefore a selection 
must be made out of the diversity of videotapes in 
order for future generations to be able to get an exem­
plary idea of them. In doing so, the works to be preserved 
will not be selected as pieces of material evidence of 
video art as it once was, but as evidence, documents, 
and representatives of significant social and cultural 
values. This is why in their museal enactment they do 
not appear as purposeless "things as such," but rather 
as relevant "things for us," as interfaces to the know­
ledge about and understanding of our culture, our history, 
and our society.
Actively collecting works of video art is the first step 
towards their preservation. Those works from the 
wealth and diversity of video art should be collected 
which possess significant cultural value, whose preser­
vation and memory lie in the interest of society. This is 
why active collecting is better than random, contingent 
selection. Cultural heritage should be consciously and 
specifically appropriated and preserved. Precise and 
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explicit collection guidelines therefore need to be 
developed.
But what does that mean? A work of video art that 
represents significant cultural value and whose preser­
vation and memory lie in the interest of society? It 
becomes obvious here that the notions of collecting, 
cultural significance, and preservation for posterity are 
highly charged and ideological concepts. For this reason 
they can, of course, be easily criticized from any other 
ideological standpoint. But it must be clearly stated that 
in this matter there is no neutral position free of ideol­
ogy. For this reason there is also no morally superior 
position. The only chance consists in becoming aware 
of the ideological implication of collecting and musealiz- 
ing, explicitly disclosing the decisions and the underly­
ing ideology of collecting as such, and justifying them 
by way of discursive argumentation.
Preserving and Conserving
Let us now turn to questions concerning the preser­
vation of digital code for posterity. Unfortunately, the 
aging process cannot be halted, something we notice 
daily on our own bodies. It can only be slowed down 
artificially. The restorer is therefore an anti-aging spe­
cialist. Thus the question is: How can one slow down 
physical aging? This is an applied science. One can 
either actively slow down the aging process by influenc­
ing the material object itself, or one can passively slow 
it down by influencing its environmental conditions. 
This primarily includes the control of light, temperature, 
humidity, dust, or magnetic fields.
Conservation, too, is highly ideological. To a large extent 
it is dependent on the respective Zeitgeist. Above all, 
however, it depends on the technical knowledge about 
the processes that lead to the degradation of the me­
dium. Both that once undertaken for the preservation 
of a work is determined by the Zeitgeist as is that which 
was not undertaken. This inevitably means that even 
the strategies for the preservation and conservation of 
digital code are dependent on the prevailing Zeitgeist 
and on prevailing ideologies, and that they will also con­
tinue to change in the future.
For myself as a non-restorer, the history and theory 
of restoration appear to be a history of failure, of 
misunderstandings, and of making errors. This is why I 
deeply mistrust any ideology of conservation and any 
well-meant pieces of advice. Dietrich Domer's book Die 
Logik des Misslingens (The Logic of Failure)1 should be 
mandatory reading in every introductory course on the 
ethics of restoration. The following historical example 
perhaps serves to illustrate the reason for my mistrust.
In 1979, Gerhard Lechenauer wrote the following pas­
sage in his book Video machen (Making Videos):
Compared to rolls of film, it is relatively unproblematic 
to store videotapes. Their electric features do not 
change over time. Film material changes despite its 
being stored in air-conditioned rooms. The most serious 
factor to be mentioned is the fading of colors. The fre­
quent video system changes in recent years (with the 
exception of two-inch studio technology) makes the 
decision for a video archive system very difficult; the 
transfer of old video recordings to new systems will 
often be inevitable. It is possible that in the future, a 
favorable change will emerge in the one-inch sector. 
The Robert Bosch company has released the reproduc­
tion rights to its one-inch video system (Quadruplex). 
Based on the lower costs for the one-inch magnetic 
tape with a higher-quality image, this format is particu­
larly interesting for archiving purposes.2
In retrospect, the author succumbed to a cannonball 
of a false estimation. But are we better off today? For 
me it would be more interesting to ask which strategies 
and modes of thinking regarding the future of long-term 
archiving one should or could have applied in 1979 
in order to find out where the journey will be headed 
in this sector over the next twenty-five years. Trend 
researchers and futurologists such as Matthias Horx or 
Peter Wippemann would seem to be the right people 
to contact in this respect. After all, in 1979 VHS had 
already been available for two years, and Sony's Beta­
max for one. Gerhard Lechenauer certainly knew noth­
ing about CD-ROMs and DVDs in 1979, although theo­
retically he could have already been slightly familiar with 
the CD, as it had been developed in the 1970s. But
1 Dietrich Dorner, Die Logik des Misslingens: strategisches
Denken in komplexen Situationen (Reinbek bei Hamburg. 1989).
2 Gerhard Lechenauer, Video machen (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1979).
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wouldn't it have been much more interesting in 1979 
to have taken the reverse path and to have exposed 
important videos to film material, which from today's 
point of view seems to be considerably and more last­
ingly durable? Despite my criminally foolish storage 
methods, my first normal-eight experimental film from 
1969 still possesses superior sharpness and color qual­
ity. In retrospect I would have to say that it was a good 
thing I worked with film at the time and not with video.
In any case, I have the suspicion that the latest inno­
vations in this area are time and again regarded as 
cure-alls for all of our unsolved preservation problems. 
Currently, all hopes with respect to long-term archiving 
are being pinned on DVDs and the open-source for­
mats. But it could very quickly become unfashionable to 
write a new patch or a new driver for Linux. We have 
finally arrived at a point which the nearly ninety-year-old 
historian Eric Hobsbawm several years ago clothed in 
the question: Can one learn something for the future 
out of the past? Regardless of what one's principle view 
is on this question, I consider it worthwhile attempting 
to think about how one might bring a few good an­
swers for future strategies for the preservation and con­
servation of video art out of the numerous historically 
recurring patterns of expectations, states of euphoria, 
and disappointments.
